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Abstract 
This  paper  deals  with  theoretical  and  empirical  dimension  of  publishing  interest  rates 
projections by central banks. Its first goal is to review arguments in favor of and against 
this decision and to illustrate the debate using experience of four central banks which pub-
lish or used to publish interest rates forecast. The second objective is to evaluate the Czech 
National Bank’s capability to efficiently use publishing of its interest rates forecasts to 
increase further its transparency, accountability and credibility. We argue that (i) the CNB 
meets all requirements needed for making its interest rate forecast public; (ii) more spe-
cifically, we do not find any evidence of significantly worse CNB’s performance in in-
terest rates forecasting compared to other institutions; (iii) it is not clear whether the risk 
assessment in combination with verbal description of interest rate forecast currently used 
has always been sufficiently precise guidance for the market participants; (iv) after the CNB 
starts publishing interest rates forecasts in 2008, market expectations will probably move 
closer to the CNB’s view which should in turn enhance accountability and credibility of 
the CNB’s forecasts and improve the efficiency of its monetary policy conduct at all. 
1. Introduction 
From  the beginning  of  2008  the Czech  National  Bank  (hereafter  the CNB) 
will publish the trajectory of interest rates (in the form of a fan-chart) consistent with 
its quarterly macroeconomic forecast. This decision of the bank board taken in March 
2007 will mean a further step towards greater transparency of the CNB’s monetary 
policy which has been conducted within the inflation targeting regime since 1998.
1
It is well documented that the inflation-targeting regime has brought the trans-
parency of central banks into special focus. For instance Goodhart (2001) and Archer 
(2005), using the example of the U.K. and New Zealand respectively, show that in-
flation-targeting central banks are particularly highly dependent on the market per-
ception of their policy decisions and their communication. This is the case due to 
the fact that longer-term interest rates given inter alia by market expectations of fu-
* This paper represents the authors’ own views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Czech National 
Bank. We would like to thank Martin ýihák and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. How-
ever, all errors and omissions remain entirely the fault of the authors.
1Also starting in 2008, the number of monetary policy meetings of the board will be reduced to eight from
the current number of twelve. Moreover, the CNB will publish the votes cast by the board members on inte-
rest rate decisions by name as of 2008. Simultaneously, the new inflation target for y-o-y CPI inflation at 
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ture monetary policy are the very factor playing a role in the actual decision-making 
of economic agents. And, accordingly, these longer-term rates (rather than the short- 
-term ones under direct control of a central bank) co-determine the ultimate macro-
economic outcomes the central bank aims to influence. In this respect, the transparent 
communication of a central bank assessment of the current state of the economy and 
its likely future development including implicit risks and monetary policy pressures 
thereof is a prerequisite for successfully conducting monetary policy in this regime. 
At the same time, inflation-targeting central banks
2 have recognized the pheno-
menon of an undetermined level of inflation with that being anchored by the expec-
tations of agents formed with direct relation to monetary policy regime, its objectives 
and track record. A central bank’s decision to publish its own forecasts for the policy 
interest rate is a further step towards greater openness and clarity in com-munication. 
This decision does not affect the execution of monetary policy, but has certain conse-
quences for the forecasting process at central banks. Furthermore, the currently applied 
inflation targeting approach is mainly based on the “management of expectations”, as 
formulated by Woodford (2005). He claims “for not only do expectations about policy 
matter, but […] very little else matters”.
To get a more realistic picture of the economy in this respect, inflation targeters 
have been gradually moving from constant interest rate assumptions underlying their 
macroeconomic forecasts (a conditional forecast) to a fully consistent framework where 
the agents’ endogenous inflation and interest-rate expectations are an integral part of 
the whole macroeconomic forecast (an unconditional forecast). 
Thus, the ability of the monetary authority to influence expectations in this 
manner
3 is directly related to the transparency and communication of an inflation-tar-
geting central bank. In various aspects, this article addresses challenges an inflation- 
-targeting central bank faces if it decides to publish the endogenous trajectory of in-
terest rates underlying its macroeconomic forecast. In the perspective of that men-
tioned above, publishing endogenous interest rates could be considered as the best 
practice of central banking transparency and communication.  
However, not only inflation targeters but also other central banks have been 
getting more and more transparent in the last decade, compared to what the standard 
in this business was fifteen or more years ago. From today’s perspective it is almost 
impossible to imagine that prior to 1994, the Fed’s FOMC decisions regarding the fe-
deral funds rate were assumed to be implicitly announced through the size and type 
of open market operations taking place the next day. 
From a theoretical or more general point of view, transparency has become 
an integral part of the triangle of central banking principles comprising the accoun-
tability and credibility of central banks along with their aim to behave transparently. 
By applying these core principles many central banks deal with challenges stemming 
from the fact that they have become almost fully independent from governments 
(even being sometimes accused of getting out of democratic control). Following these 
three principles of central bank independence
4 is considered to be the best way to 
solve the potential problem of time- or dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy. 
2 In 2007, 24 central banks are conducting their monetary policy within the inflation targeting regime.  
3 That is to encourage economic agents to form their expectations according to systematic monetary policy
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Despite a generally-shared broad picture on what transparency basically means 
and what its benefits are, there are few common views on the details. Winkler (2000) 
for example provides a very nice and comprehensive discussion on various aspects and 
features  of  transparency  including  the mutual  relationships  and i n t e rdependence  be-
tween the communication, transparency, independence, credibility, predictability and ef-
ficiency of monetary policy. Not surprisingly, he has found that the term transparency 
is vague and often contradictory in both academic literature and in the practitioners` 
thinking. As he stressed, transparency cannot simply be reduced to a central bank’s 
openness and thus more information provided by the bank does not necessarily mean 
a higher level of mutual understanding between a central bank and the general public. 
As a result, he proposes his own broader definition of the term being referred to as 
“common understanding” that “points to the need that both the sender and the receiver 
in the monetary policy game share a common mode of interpretation” (p. 26).  
In reality, there are a number of signs of central bank transparency to be seen in 
various aspects of their behaviour beyond those that have been mentioned for the case 
of inflation targeters. All central banks are now more or less transparent concerning 
their primary objectives including their willingness to reveal considerations and prefe-
rences regarding possible conflict (trade-off) between inflation and GDP fluctuations.  
The increasing transparency of a central bank has been reflected in the better 
market  perception  of  the bank  and  in  its  forecasting  performance.  In  his  paper, 
Swanson (2004) shows that the aforementioned Fed´s decision to start explicitly an-
nouncing changes in its federal fund rate target in 1994 and the previous and sub-
sequent steps taken to increase the Fed`s transparency have led to generally better 
and more certain forecasts of the markets by private sector forecasters. Similarly, 
Bauer et al. (2006) find out that the private agents´ ability to predict future economic 
developments has increased to a certain extent since 1994 when the Fed started pub-
lishing its view of the economic outlook with the expectations of market participants 
being more closely in line each other.  
In sum, a high level of central bank transparency is considered as positive. 
However, some economists claim that the transparency of central banks can go too 
far and can damage the efficiency of the monetary policy execution. Mishkin (2004) 
argued that increased transparency will complicate the communication process and 
weaken support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives.  
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The second chapter reviews 
arguments in favor of and against publishing the interest rate forecast as the top case of 
transparency. The third chapter then examines the experience of central banks that al-
ready publish interest rate forecasts or used to publish interest rate forecasts. The fourth 
chapter gives an overview of discussions on this topic taking place at the CNB and ge-
nerally in the Czech environment with the fifth chapter concluding and summarizing. 
2. The Clash of Arguments 
There has been quite a lively dispute in literature as to whether or not central 
banks  should  publish  the trajectory  of  interest  rates  consistent  with  their  macro-
economic forecasts, i.e. the endogenous trajectory generated by a monetary policy 
4 Central bank independence may in general comprise several dimensions such as institutional indepen-
dence, operational independence, personal independence and (last but not least) financial independence. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    561
reaction function of the particular central bank. This chapter picks up arguments for 
both these options (to disclose or not to disclose the rates) as discussed in literature 
and among practitioners.  
In their paper, Mayes and Tarkka (1999) were among the first to address 
issues of making public statements on a central bank’s views of the future. Even if 
the forecasts are imprecise, Mayes and Tarkka find several potential reasons for do-
ing so, such as (i) it helps reduce uncertainty for other decision-makers increasing 
the allocative efficiency of the economy; (ii) it enhances the credibility of the mone-
tary policy pursuit of price stability and reduces the costs of the disinflationary po-
licy; (iii) it improves the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies; (iv) it provides 
a sort of democratic accountability of a central bank, and finally (v) it helps a cen-
tral bank to follow a consistent strategy with the possibility to learn from its ex-
perience. 
As for the forecast of interest rates in particular, Mayes and Tarkka depart 
from  the idea  that  monetary  policy,  within  the inflation  targeting  regime,  aims  at 
the achievement of the inflation target rather than on merely reaching or maintaining 
the required level of interest rates (frequently being kept constant for forecasting pur-
poses as was the traditional idea until recently). Then, if a central bank shows a pro-
jection not hitting its target under such a constant interest rate assumption it must add 
how the “true” future interest rate settings will differ from the assumption. And si-
multaneously, what this will mean for the future outcome and its deviation from the ori-
ginal forecast, so that “the private sector can be convinced both that the bank has not 
changed the goals of policy and that they can be achieved with the instruments at 
hand” (Mayes, Tarkka, 1999, p. 13). Thus, the central bank needs to clearly outline 
its own upcoming behavior with policy makers knowing and following the strategy 
when setting monetary policy in the future. Based on their analysis, the authors con-
clude that the particular trajectory generated by the model and/or shown in the pro-
jection cannot be considered as a commitment to future actions. This should rather be 
taken as an illustration of how monetary policy could evolve, under the assumptions 
taken in the projection, to reach inflation close to the target.  
A serious argument against disclosing interest rates builds on the recognition 
of the double-edged nature of public information used for policy-making. In this con-
text, publishing the future interest rate path may be too effective in influencing 
the actions of economic agents, as suggested by Amato, Morris and Shin (2002). Then, 
as the authors claim, the agents may overreact to public information and, since cen-
tral bankers do not have a monopoly on wisdom, a central bank’s faulty judgment on 
the future interest rates will cause damage to the market participants. And at the same 
time, the private information of individual agents is not used optimally with channels 
through which the market mechanism aggregates and disseminates information on 
the economic fundamentals being disrupted. According to the authors, this is espe-
cially the case if the acquisition of private information is costly for the individual 
agents. Amato, Morris and Shin then conclude that the ex-ante value of private in-
formation will be devalued together with an incentive to gain such information.  
Svensson (2006), however, using the same model as Amato, Morris and Shin 
(2002) challenges their results that more public information can be bad for social 
welfare. Svensson elaborates more on the model used and finds out that for empiri-
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parency. And moreover, even under a conservative assumption of the equal accuracy 
of the public and private information, one can expect higher social welfare with pub-
lic information than without.
5
As stated in (Mishkin, 2004), there are in general numerous reasons for a cen-
tral bank to publish its macroeconomic forecast as such. It helps the public and the mar-
kets understand actions taken by the bank and to assess whether the bank really seeks 
to hit its inflation target. Simultaneously, the credibility of monetary policy could in-
crease in the eyes of the general public if it has the possibility to evaluate the central 
bank’s forecast performance and to see that the forecast is prepared using the best 
practice, which in turn makes an incentive for the bank to prepare good, accurate, in-
ternally consistent forecasts.
6 Despite this, Mishkin claims that “announcing the poli-
cy path is highly problematic” (2004, p. 54). According to him, one objection to pub-
lishing an interest rate forecast is that it would complicate the process of decision- 
-making for the central bank board or committee that only makes decisions about 
the current setting of the interest rate in currently prevailing practice among central 
banks. Then, the projection of the rate path to be announced would clearly require 
the board or committee to come to an agreement on it, which would likely be a real 
problem in particular for the more distant future and the process as such could be 
impaired.
7
The second problem with publishing the interest rate forecast according to 
Mishkin is that it can complicate the central bank’s communication with the public. 
There is a severe danger that the public will understand this trajectory as an uncondi-
tional commitment of the bank to set the rates just in line with the announced trajec-
tory. When a change to the path is made by the bank in the next forecast after newly 
available information is assessed, the public may blame the bank for making a mistake 
and giving out its previously announced policy. This could in turn undermine the cen-
tral bank’s credibility and might weaken support for the bank and its independence.
8
More recently, Rudebusch and Williams (2006) examined the macroeconomic 
effects of a central bank’s direct revelation of its expectations about the future path of 
the policy rate. They made use of New Keynesian model with asymmetric infor-
mation to show that, in an economy where private agents have imperfect information 
about the determination of monetary policy, a central bank’s communication of inte-
rest rate projections can help shape financial market expectations and may improve 
overall macroeconomic performance. 
5 Morris, Shin and Tong extended this subtle discussion further in (Morris, Shin, Tong, 2006).  
6 Naturally, preparing such a reliable macroeconomic forecast imposes significant costs on a central bank. 
This, however, could conversely promote the signaling effect of publishing it as the markets can see that
the monetary policy strategy of the bank is credibly applied and the bank cannot be accused of doing 
“cheap talk”, as described in (Mayes, Tarkka, 1999).  
7 A similarly complicated process of seeking for a common perspective on the future interest rate tra-
jectory may evolve during the discussion between the central bank staff responsible for the forecast and 
the decision makers.  
8 Such an illusion of an unconditional commitment can be reduced to a great extent or even eliminated by 
a central bank having an open discussion on the assumptions, risks and uncertainties of its forecast.
The bank can also present the interest rate projection in the form of a fan chart with uncertainty intervals 
around the forecasts to illustrate the uncertainty with several different sensitivity analyses shown to outline
alternative interest rate paths if the economic developments deviate from the baseline scenario, as it is 
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Given the limited practical experience with publishing an interest rate fore-
cast, the empirical studies on its effects are rather scarce. Archer (2005) finds a very 
limited effect of unexpected changes in the reserve Bank of New Zealand interest 
rate forecast on the market yield curve. He interprets this evidence as support for 
the idea that financial markets in New Zealand have understood the conditional na-
ture of the projections. 
Ferrero a Secchi (2007) use panel data from Norway, New Zealand, the U.S. 
and  the euro  area  to  show  that  the communication  of  future  policy  intentions, 
either quantitative or qualitative, improves the ability of market operators to pre-
dict monetary policy decisions. They particularly focused on the case of the Re-
serve Bank of New Zealand, and showed that the publication of the interest rate 
forecast has had a significant impact on market expectations. Also, they find that 
the change  in  market  interest  rates  in  the period  included  between  two  publi-
cations of the interest rate forecast is similar to the revision of the forecast. This 
supports  the idea  that  market  participants  well  understand  the conditionality  of 
the interest rate forecasts. 
Kahn (2007) reviews the topic by providing standard arguments on the bene-
fits and drawbacks of publishing interest rates. Taking these into account from both 
a theoretical and practical point of view, Kahn concludes that it might be difficult for 
monetary policy decision-making bodies to find a consensus on the final interest rate 
trajectory. The different views on the objectives, models and forecasts among the bank 
board members can, however, have a positive value as such and can compensate for 
the lack of common views on the interest rate path.  
Besides those more or less general or theoretical arguments, there are a few 
pros and cons that can be raised from the practical point of view by people who are 
directly involved in forecasting and policy process in central banks. Namely, an ar-
gument in favor may be that publishing interest rate forecasts would enable mone-
tary policy decision makers to openly express their potential distance from the whole 
macroeconomic forecast by a possible deviation of the actual interest rate setting 
from the projected trajectory of rates. In fact, this is the only relevant way of doing 
so in an environment of unconditional forecasts with an endogenous interest rate 
path.  
An argument against publishing from a similar perspective might be the fol-
lowing. Having the rates undisclosed may prevent the staff from producing the fo-
recast due to intentional fine-tuning or even manipulating the endogenous rate tra-
jectory during the forecasting process to get the final path in line to what the board or 
markets expect. This threat, however, can be to a certain extent reduced by letting 
the staff be an owner of the forecast and by announcing this ownership.  
Moreover, central banks are nowadays quite often able to successfully influ-
ence market expectations on future interest rate paths without  an explicit announ-
cement of the interest rate forecasts. Under these conditions, the probable and rather 
naturally arising deviations of interest rate forecasts from reality may then lower this 
influence of monetary policy on interest rates of longer maturities which in turn may 
undermine the efficiency of monetary policy execution. But this particular risk does 
not have to be very serious in reality and may be offset by the numerous other po-
sitives of publishing interest rates. The following chapters of the article deal with that 
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In the special case of a central bank conducting its monetary policy within 
ERM II participation, publishing the interest rate forecast may discover the mutual 
inconsistency of policy targets. This might be the case under certain conditions when, 
for example, a need to fight against inflation using interest rate hikes to meet the Maas-
tricht criterion for price stability could cause the criteria defined for long-term inte-
rest rates to be missed.  
In summary, the balance between the pros and cons of making an endogenous 
interest rate path public is far from being skewed to either side dominantly. In our 
view, however, the positives of doing so are somewhat more reasonable than the ne-
gatives especially if the latter can be considerably reduced by efficient central bank 
communications and other measures taken.  
3. Experience of Pioneering Central Banks 
As suggested in sections 1 and 2 of this article, many central banks and mone-
tary authorities publish their macroeconomic projections for the economy and the futu-
re values of key variables such as inflation or GDP. Nevertheless, there are currently 
only a few central banks around the world which have practical experience in publish-
ing macroeconomic projections based on endogenous interest rate projections (EIRPs). 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (since June 1997), Norges Bank (since November 
2005) and Sveriges Riksbank (since February 2007) currently publish endogenous in-
terest rate forecasts. Banco de la República Colombia used to publish such a forecast 
(from December 2003 to June 2004). EIRP has recently started to be published in 
the Central Bank of Iceland (March 2007) and the Bank of Israel (July 2007). 
In this part we focus on describing the main experiences – where available – in 
publishing EIRPs and on comparing the historical development of interest rate fo-
recasts with the subsequent outcomes. Evaluating the trajectories of endogenous in-
terest rate forecasts is relatively complicated. For example Archer (2005, p. 8) argues 
that “it is exceedingly difficult to formally evaluate the practice of publishing interest 
rate projections, given the absence of a counterfactual, and the existence of a myriad 
of other influences on monetary policy that makes cross-country comparisons fraught”.
This difficulty also stems from the fact that only in the case of New Zealand and 
Norway we do have such a history. 
3.1 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Until November 2005 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was the only 
central bank preparing and publishing macroeconomic projections based on EIRPs. 
RBNZ emphasised the uncertainties of EIRPs from the very beginning. Its Monetary 
Policy  Statement  (June  1997,  p. 8)  communicated  EIRPs  in  the following  way: 
“The projected path […], it should also be stressed, is very dependent on the assump-
tions made and on the economic information available at the time of preparing the pro-
jections. As new information becomes available, and as assumptions are modified, 
the outlook for inflation pressures will change, and this will alter the projected track 
[…]” McCaw and Ranchhod (2002, p. 7) claim that “[…] monetary policy response 
is conditional on all other variables evolving exactly as projected, which is of course 
not considered particularly likely. […] We constantly stress the conditionality of 
the projections to discourage readers from misinterpreting our forecasts as a strongly- 
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RBNZ  publishes  EIRP  in  a form  of  line-chart,  in  contrast  to  the Norges 
Bank and Sveriges Riksbank, which use fan-charts, i.e. the probability bands of 
projection outcomes over time. RBNZ regularly publishes a graph with its current 
and  last  prediction  of  the EIRP  together  with  an Excel  spreadsheet  containing 
the exact numbers rounded to one decimal place. Figure 1 shows the development 
of the 90-day interest rate and the RBNZ’s EIRP forecast from the beginning of 
2001. From this figure it is clear that: (i) EIRPs were mostly lower than the actual 
outcomes from the beginning of 2004 to now, (ii) EIRPs were much more volatile 
before the end of 2003 than subsequently. An assessment of the RBNZ’s forecast 
against the Consensus Forecasts covering the period 2003–2005 can be found in 
(Turner, 2005). 
Generally, RBNZ evaluates its experience with the publication of EIRPs po-
sitively. For example, Archer (2005) concludes that “[…] most of the time markets 
understand the conditionality of projections, a handful of counter-examples notwith-
standing […]” (p. 3). Furthermore, (p. 8) he claims: “It turns out that many of the pre-
sumed problems have not caused great difficulty in New Zealand, while some are yet 
to be tested.” RBNZ also feels that there are particular benefits with regard to higher 
transparency. RBNZ 
9 claims that “while acknowledging the risks to credibility given 
the inherent inaccuracy of forecasts, we think that they can be overcome with an ap-
propriate balance between the use of projections as a prediction of future outcomes, 
and as an expository device that illustrates the key policy issues.” The self-evalu-
ation of RNBZ with EIRPs is formulated as follows: “Over recent years, we have per-
haps presented projections in more detail than is warranted for the role that they 
play, and have tied the discussion of the policy decision too mechanically to the pro-
jections. These thoughts encourage us to move Monetary Policy Statements further in 
the direction of downplaying the detail associated with the central projection path,  










I/2001 III I/2002 III I/2003 III I/2004 III I/2005 III I/2006 III I/2007 III I/2008 III I/2009 III I/2010
EIRP actual interest rate
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
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increasing the emphasis on the policy issues revealed, and more clearly outlining 
the uncertainties that are part and parcel of the art of setting monetary policy.”
3.2 The Norges Bank 
The Norges Bank’s move to publish EIRPs was gradual. Until the end of 2002 
its forecasts were based on a constant interest rate assumption. Qvigstad (2006a) con-
firms that the preliminary step was taken at the beginning of 2003, when the Exe-
cutive board started to publish its own four-month forecast interval.
10 In November 
2005, the Norges Bank took this process one step further and decided to publish its 
EIRPs three years ahead. This made the Norges Bank the second central  bank  in 
the world to start publishing EIRPs and the first one to do so by means of a fan chart. 
Its Inflation Report (November 2005, p. 5) says “Our interest rate projections further 
out are somewhat higher than forward rates in the financial market…The Executive 
Board has endorsed the analysis and the projection for future interest rate develop-
ments in this Report.” On page 54 it states: “The projections in this Report are based 
on  interest  rate  developments  that  in  the Executive Board’s assessment provide 
a reasonable path for the Norwegian economy and a reasonable balance  between 
the objectives of monetary policy.” The current Monetary Policy Report (formerly 
Inflation  Report)  contains  a fan  chart  prediction  for  inflation,  the output  gap  and 
the key policy rate for the next three-year period. The central bank publishes 90 %, 
70 %, 50 % and 30 % upper and lower bands around the baseline scenario (the EIRP) 
as well as charts indicating how the projections would be different under specific al-
ternative scenarios. Figure 2 describes the six EIRPs for the repo rate. The first four 
of them show a lower EIRP than the subsequent outcome.  










IV/2005 II/2006 IV II/2007 IV II/2008 IV II/2009 IV II/2010 IV
EIRP actual interest rate
Source: Norges Bank
10 From the June 2004 publication of interest rate bands for the subsequent 4 months (although the target 
was not necessarily at the centre of this interval); publication after this 4 month horizon from November
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Norway’s experience with EIRPs shows that MPC needs to have criteria that 
define  an “appropriate  interest  rate  path” ( Q v i g s t a d,  2006b).  Norges  Bank  is  at 
present using six criteria for what constitutes an appropriate interest rate path.
11 Each 
issue of the Norges Bank Inflation Report contains a box formulating the criteria that 
the Bank follows. This notwithstanding, Qvigstad (2006a) stresses that “[…] estab-
lishing these criteria is an ongoing process, and should not be interpreted as ‘com-
mandments’ that are carved in stone”.
3.3 The Sveriges Riksbank and The Banco de la República Colombia 
Both The Sveriges Riksbank and The Banco de la República Colombia have, 
or used to have, a very short experience with the publication of EIRPs. Up to autumn 
2005, the Riksbank used a conditional forecast on the assumption of a constant repo 
rate within the forecast period. On the one hand, the advantage of this conditional 
forecast was officially formulated as easier communication when the new monetary 
regime was established and before the new inflation target built up its credibility. On 
the other hand, it was not possible to create a realistic forecast of the key macroeco-
nomic variables under this approach. The Riksbank tries to resolve these problems by 
producing forecasts based on market expectations, as reflected in implied forward 
rates. It is obvious that market expectations provide a much more realistic path for 
the future development of the repo rate than the assumption of a constant repo rate. 
Nevertheless, with the use of market expectations the Riksbank cannot clearly ex-
plain the consistent development  of interest rates to the general public and the fi-
nancial markets together with its explanation of monetary policy decisions. A further 
step  towards  greater  transparency  and  clarity  was  made  in  February  2007  with 
the Riksbank’s decision to publish its unconditional forecast, i.e. its own EIRP (repo 
rate). A more detailed description of the Riksbank's forecasts  and their communi-
cation is provided in (Apel, Vredin, 2007). They also evaluate the Riksbanks expe-
rience with publishing its first two EIRPs (February and June 2007) and describe 
some difficulties in selling these EIRPs to the market participants. These difficulties 
are also mentioned in Svensson (2007, p. 3): “Many market agents considered that 
the interest  rate  forecast  in  February  was  too  low.  However,  in  connection  with 
the June forecast some agents were surprised at how much we had adjusted the fore-
cast upwards.” Even though the EIRPs surprised the market, the Riksbank's forecasts 
have been at least partially built in the spot market rates, as Apel and Vredin (2007) 
show.
Banco de la República Colombia published its EIRPs only three times, between 
December 2003 and June 2004. The Bank showed two scenarios in its Inflation Report
“[…] a) the basic scenario that maintains the policy rule active and therefore offers 
a path of interest rates that is compatible with the long-term inflation targets; and 
b) an alternative scenario that presents the inflation results under the assumption that 
CDT (Certificate of Deposit) rates are constant for two consecutive years.” (December 
Inflation Report, p. 12). The Bank published the values of the EIRP forecast in a table 
for a term of 2 years, with the exact numbers rounded to one – and later to two – de-
cimal places. The December 2003 Inflation Report formulates the EIRPs in the follow-
ing way “[…] forecasts are consistent with a rise of 100 bp in 90-day CDT rates in 
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2004 and an additional 90 bp in 2005. This increase would be partly due to the rise in 
external interest rates. The current 90-day CDT rate is around  8.0 %.” (December 
Inflation Report, p. 13). The balance of risks was only discussed verbally by the Bank. 
The Bank only used the fan chart approach for inflation, i.e. not for the other predicted 
variables, including interest rates. From unofficial consultations we received two rea-
sons  for  why  the Bank  stopped  publishing  EIRPs.  The first  one  was  that  emerging 
markets are very sensitive to external shocks, which in the case of Columbia is evident 
from strong fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate. The second one was a technical 
one. The Banco de la República admitted that it had not had a sufficiently accurate and 
sensitive  macroeconomic  model.
12 B o t h  of  these  factors  resulted  in  communication 
problems which eventually culminated in a decision to stop publishing EIRPs. 
4. The CNB Dilemma 
The CNB monetary policy is, similarly to the monetary policy of the above-
mentioned central banks, conducted within the inflation targeting framework. In this 
framework, the primary objective of the central bank is maintaining price stability. 
To fulfil this objective, the central bank changes interest rates in order to keep in-
flation near the inflation target. Accordingly and due to a certain time lag between 
an actual interest rate move and a consequent response of macroeconomic and in-
flation developments, a prominent role in this framework is given to the forecast of 
future economic developments.  
The CNB forecast is built up using its core structural model QPM (Quarterly 
Projection Model). One of the QPM's equations stylistically describes the central bank 
behaviour in setting the interest rates. In addition to the inflation forecast’s deviation 
from the inflation target, interest rate smoothing and perspectives on the real side of 
the economy  come  into  the central  bank’s  consideration  as  captured  in  the QPM 
reaction function.
13
Since July 2002, when the first unconditional forecast based on the QPM was 
released, the CNB has not disclosed the numerical values of the interest rate forecast. 
Instead, it has started to publish a verbal description of the interest rate forecast, 
which gives the reader a hint as to the direction of future monetary policy measures 
as predicted by the model, but not their size. The description usually consists of one 
sentence which has standard and rather technical wording like "Consistent with 
the macroeconomic forecast and its assumptions is growth in nominal interest rates."
(the October 2007, Inflation Report, p. 11).  
In addition to this sentence, outsiders can get some clue of the CNB interest rate 
forecast from the description of the financial analysts' interest rate expectations. In chap-
ter IV.4 of the Inflation Report, these expectations are verbally compared with the CNB 
forecast. Looking again into the October 2007 Inflation Report we find a sentence at 
the bottom of p. 42: "The interest rate path consistent with the aforementioned CNB fo-
recast was slightly above the expectations of financial market analysts for the near 
future. At the longer horizon, it was higher." This comparison allows the market to 
make a relatively contrived guess as to what the CNB interest rate forecast looks like. 
12 For more information on the model of the Columbian economy see the (Inflation Report, 2003), Banco 
de la República, June, and (Gómez, Vargas, Uribe, 2002). 
13 See (Coats, Laxton, Rose, 2003) for more details on the Czech QPM. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    569
As time passed, intentions to publish a forecast-consistent interest rate path in 
numerical form emerged. The motivation behind these deliberations was the further 
improvement of monetary policy transparency, as previous measures towards greater 
openness  have  been  perceived  positively  by  the public.  Based  on t he detailed 
discussion of potential pros and cons of publishing interest rates, the Bank Board decid-
ed, in March 2007, to reveal the numerical values of the interest rate forecast effective 
from 2008. 
In addition to the theoretical arguments, as described in section 2, and the prac-
tical  experience  of  central  banks  that  already  publish  interest r a te  forecasts 
(the RBNZ, Bank of Norway, Sveriges Riksbank) or used to publish interest rate 
forecasts (Banco de la República Colombia), as described in section 3 of this paper, 
several Czech country-specific arguments have been raised. In the rest of this section 
we review some of these specific arguments. 
We analyze the possible impact of publishing interest rate forecasts on the pri-
vate  forecasts  and  discuss  the role  of  asymmetric  risk  assessment  in  the desired 
impact of the forecast on private expectations. 
4.1 Accuracy of the CNB Forecasts 
The CNB interest rate forecasts do not seem very accurate at first sight. If we 
look at historical interest rates forecasts on the background of the actually realized 
interest rate path, as depicted in Figure 3, we can see significant errors in the CNB 
interest rate forecasts. Related to this, the consequent forecasts mutually differ to 
a significant extent.  
However, the inaccuracy in the CNB interest rate forecasts must be seen on 
the background of relatively high interest rates volatility stemming from the struc-
tural characteristics of the Czech economy. Being characterized as a small, converg-
ing and very open economy, any external shock (especially a shock in the exchange 
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rate) has a substantial effect on the interest rate forecast. Temporary shocks have 
major  impacts  on  the interest  rate  forecast  in  the short  run  (less  than  3 quarters), 
the longer-run  pattern  of  the forecasts  is  determined  mainly  by t he assumed  con-
vergence of the interest rates to their “policy neutral” level.
14 So far, the initial setting 
of the interest rate in all forecasts has been below the neutral level, and thus interest 
rate forecasts have been upward sloping. The short-end of the forecasts is downward 
sloping  in  periods  with  disinflationary  shock  (July  and  October 2 0 0 2,  July  and 
October 2003, January and April 2005), but in a majority of the forecasts the interest 
rates were projected to rise in the short run. 
If we compare the CNB forecast with forecasts of other institutions, we do not 
find significant differences with regard to their accuracy in light of the relatively high 
historical volatility of interest rates. Table 1 reports the mean forecast error (ME) and 
root-mean-squared forecast error (RMSE) for the CNB forecast 1 month
15 and 1 year 
ahead with the financial market analysts' forecast
16 and market's forecast
17. The ME sta-
tistic indicates the degree of bias in forecasts, i.e. it shows whether there is any over- or 
under-predicting over time. The RMSE is the complement statistic, which provides 
a measure of forecast accuracy. It measures how far away forecasts were from actual 
out-turns. All the CNB’s forecasts tend to overestimate the actual interest rates, espe-
cially on the 1-year horizon. The CNB forecast is more accurate on the nearer horizon 
while on the 1-year horizon it is less accurate than other forecasts. However, diffe-
rences in the mean errors are, given the historical volatility of interest rates, negligible. 
Even smaller differences are in forecasting errors as measured by RMSE.
18 These fin- 
TABLE 1  Accuracy of the CNB and Other Institutions Forecasts 
Forecast horizon 
1-month  1-year 
ýNB Mean error  0.02  0.54 
RMSE 0.15  0.87 
Financial 
analysts  Mean error  -0.05  0.45 
RMSE 0.17  0.83 
Market Mean error  0.03  0.41 
RMSE 0.14  0.76 
Notes: ME – mean forecast error, ME =   ¦(() ) Ex x
n
 ; RMSE – root mean squared forecast error,  
RMSE – root mean squared forecast error, RMSE = 
2  ¦(() ) Ex x
n
Source: authors’ calculation based on Czech National Bank data 
14 This level is set as the equilibrium real interest rate plus model consistent inflation forecast. The equi-
librium real interest rate is then derived in line with trends in the real version of uncovered interest rate 
parity evolving in the background of the cyclical part of the CNB`s core model.  
15 Because the CNB forecast is prepared on a quarterly basis, we approximate the 1-month forecast by 
the forecast for the actual quarter. 
16 As collected by the CNB in the Financial Market Inflation Expectations survey. 
17 As captured by money market interest rates and forward rate agreements (FRA). 
18 We tested the hypotheses of equal mean errors and squared errors using equality tests (t-tests). The re-
sults of the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of equal mean errors and squared errors at any con-
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dings indicate the existence of a common, probably structural, source of uncertainty in 
all the forecasts. The similarity in the statistics might also  stem from the mutual de-
pendency of the forecasts, namely from the influence which the central bank forecast 
has on the market and analysts' expectations. We address this issue in more detail 
below. 
4.2 Credibility of the CNB Forecast 
The financial market pays eminent attention to the central bank forecast. Man-
del and Tomšík (2004) identified four relative advantages of a central bank forecast. 
First, the central bank has the power to set short-term interest rates; hence it can ful-
fill this part of the forecast. Second, the central bank forecast is made by the nume-
rous and qualified staff, so it usually sets a benchmark for the forecasts of market 
analysts and other think-tanks.
19 Third, the central bank is politically independent and 
has no incentives to make misguiding forecasts. Last, but not least, the central bank 
forecast is free of charge. 
If the central bank forecast is published and if it gains credibility among 
the public, it can have a significant impact on private expectations. To test the cre-
dibility of the CNB forecasts we analyzed the effect of the CNB forecast for CPI 
inflation, which is disclosed in numerical values, on the financial analysts' expecta-
tions. In this simple model, the financial analysts' expectations should come closer to 
the CNB forecast after its disclosure if the CNB forecast is credible. To test this hy-
pothesis we regress the change in the analysts' inflation expectations one year ahead 
ǻEanalysts(CPIt+1)  on  the difference  between  the CNB  forecast  for  the same  time 
horizon  ECNB(CPIt+1)  and  the analysts'  inflation  expectations  before  the release  of 
the CNB  forecast  Eanalysts(CPIt+1). The regression results shown in  Table 2 d o n ot  
reject  our  hypothesis  and  suggest  that  the analysts  build  30%  of  the difference 
between the CNB forecast and their previous estimates into their expectations.
20
Surprisingly, we get similar results if we test the credibility of the CNB fore-
cast for interest rates one year ahead, even though the CNB does not yet disclose nu 
TABLE 2  Credibility of the CNB Forecast for CPI Inflation 
ǻEanalysts(CPIt+1) = C(1) + C(2)*[ECNB (CPIt+1) – Eanalysts(CPIt+1)]
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C(1) 0.02  0.04  0.52  0.61 
C(2) 0.29  0.14  1.98  0.06 
R-squared  0.30  Sum squared resid  1.38 
S.E. of regression  0.25  Durbin-Watson stat  2.12 
Note:Least Squares, Newey-West Standard Errors, 24 observations between April 2001 and January 2007 
Source: authors calculation based on the Czech National Bank data 
19 The fact that the CNB provides other central banks with technical assistance on a regular and ongoing 
basis, primarily in the field of model building, demonstrates the high level of the CNB staff’s expertise.  
20 The inflation and interest rate expectations of financial analysts are surveyed each month, therefore we
regress the change in their expectations between the month before the release of the forecast and the month 
when the forecast is released. Even within this relatively short period of time, however, the change in ex-
pectations must have also been influenced by other new relevant information available beyond the effect
of the CNB’s new forecast release. It is therefore necessary to interpret the results cautiously and as indi-
cative and we see it as the subject of possible future research in this field. 572                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
merical  values  for  interest  rate  forecasts  (see  Table  3).  In  this  case  we  regress 
the change in the analysts' interest rate expectations one year ahead ǻEanalysts(irt+1) on 
the difference between the CNB forecast for the same time horizon ECNB(irt+1) and 
the analysts'  interest  rate  expectations  before  the release  of  the CNB  forecast 
Eanalysts(irt+1).  The results  of  the regression  suggest  that  the market  participant  can 
guess the CNB's interest rate forecast, probably from the CNB's forecasts of other 
variables and using the knowledge of CNB's view on the transmission mechanism, 
namely the reaction function.
21 The estimation results of this equation are, however, af-
fected by the autocorrelation of residuals, probably stemming from a low number of 
observations. Despite this problem we can conclude that the CNB forecast is at least 
partially  credible and that financial analysts adjust their forecasts  towards the CNB 
forecast.
It is reasonable to expect that the effect of the CNB forecast on the interest 
rate expectations would be more pronounced if the CNB released the numerical va-
lues of the interest rate forecast and if the interest rate forecast was properly com-
municated.  For  the CNB  this  would m ean  the better  control  of  long-term  interest 
rates, which would make the transmission of short-term interest rates into the rest of 
the economy more efficient. As a result, the CNB would get a better grip on the eco-
nomy, including the possibility of improving an inflation-output variability trade-off.  
However, there are also the costs of publishing the interest rate forecast. First, 
the interest rates would probably be more volatile on the days when the new forecast 
is released. Also, there is a potential threat that expectations will stick too much to 
the CNB  forecast  despite  the arrival  of  new d a t a ,  w h i ch  would  otherwise  change 
them. These arguments, together with other theoretical arguments as described in sec-
tion 2, should be taken into account when deciding whether to publish interest rate 
forecasts or not. 
4.3 Asymmetric Risk Assessment 
In some situations, the impact of the forecast on the expectations might be 
distorted intentionally by the central bank. If the board of a central bank foresees 
the forecast’s risks, it might communicate these risks via a “risk assessment” (al-
ternatively called bias). The risk assessment can be either symmetric or asymmetric. 
If the assessment is asymmetric, it sends a clear signal to the market and to financial 
TABLE 3  Credibility of the CNB Forecast for Interest Rates 
ǻEanalysts(irt+1) = C(1) + C(2) * [ECNB(irt+1) – Eanalysts(irt+1)]
Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C(1) -0.07  0.05  -1.44  0.17 
C(2)  0.28  0.08   3.73  0.00 
R-squared   0.57  Sum squared resid  0.50 
S.E. of regression   0.17  Durbin-Watson stat  1.36 
Note:Least Squares, Newey-West Standard Errors, 19 observations between July 2002 and January 2007 
Source: authors calculation based on the Czech National Bank data 
21 The CNB reaction function including the coefficients´ values has been published in (Coats, Laxton,
Rose, 2003). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    573
analysts not to fully obey the message of the forecast. In these cases, the deviation of 
the private expectations from the central bank forecast is desirable. Figure 4 shows 
the difference between the CNB forecast of the future short-term interest rates and 
the market expectation of the future short-term interest rates, as captured in FRA con-
tracts (the black lines), the change in the market expectations after releasing the fo-
recast (the white diamonds) together with the risk assessment marked by arrows. 
Several findings are obvious from this chart. First, arrow marks are displayed 
only for eleven forecasts out of twenty; there are no arrows for the forecasts whose 
risk assessment, as written in the minutes of the Bank Board
 22 or in the presentation 
of the decision at the press conference,
23 was missing or unclear. Out of eleven clear 
signals of risk assessments, four pushed the private expectations in the right direc-
tion. The signalling in October 2003 and July 2006 (in ellipsoids), when the market 
expectations remained different by more than 50 basis points from the forecast, was 
the least efficient. Given this ambiguity in the results it is not clear whether the risk 
assessment in combination with a verbal description of the interest rate forecast has 
been a useful guide for the market participants. 
The second observation is that in most cases the red dots lie close to the ho-
rizontal  axes,  whereas  the blue  lines  spread  into  much  more  positive  or  negative 
values. This means that even though the forecast usually assumes a significant move 
FIGURE 4  Immediate Response of the Future Short-Term Interest Rates after the CNB 
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22 The CNB minutes are released with an 8-day delay; hence they are not publicly availably at the time 
when the forecast is published, i.e. on the day of board meeting. However we assume that the same risk 
assessment as later published in the minutes is conveyed at the press conference held immediately after
the decision. 
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in the future short-term interest rates, the immediate market reaction to the forecast 
has been modest. The only exceptions were the January 2005 forecast, where ex-
pected future short-term interest rates shifted down by 50 basis points, and the Oc-
tober 2005 forecast, with a 25 basis-point move in the opposite direction. However, 
in the majority of forecasts, the immediate shift in expectation, though small, has been 
in the right direction from the forecast perspective. 
A high degree of persistence in the market expectations as appears in Figure 4
reflects not only uncertainty connected with the real future interest path, but also un-
certainty connected with the interpretation of the verbal description of the CNB inte-
rest rate forecast. It seems reasonable to assume that the immediate market reaction 
will probably be stronger when the CNB starts publishing the numerical values of 
the forecast.  In  the case  of a symmetric  risk  assessment,  market  expectations  will 
probably be closer to the CNB forecast. In the opposite case of an asymmetric risk 
assessment, the market expectations will probably still differ from the CNB forecast 
in a desirable direction. 
5. Conclusion 
In the final part of the article we summarize our findings and make concluding 
remarks: 
First, a high level of monetary policy transparency is generally perceived to be 
positive  among  both  theoretical  economists  and  practitioners  from  central  banks. 
Steps taken by many central banks in this field have substantionally increased the com-
mon uderstanding between monetary authorities and the general public and market 
participants in the past decade. Inflation-targeting central banks have been most ac-
tive in this opening process, recognising a crucial role played by market expectations 
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Macroeconomic forecasts, as 
the key input into the decision-making process of the inflation-targeting central banks, 
have been gradually moved to make use of the fully consistent framework with 
an endogenous interest rate trajectory.  
Second, there are a number of serious theoretical and practical arguments for 
both publishing and not publishing interest rate forecasts, with the final balance of 
them not pointing to either side definitively. As we see it, however, the pros of dis-
closing the interest rate path  are  of a somewhat bigger relevance  than  the cons, 
though practical arrangements in a particular central bank play a major role. The track 
record of central banks that publish or used to publish endogenous interest rate tra-
jectories suggests that this is really a high-level standard (or even state-of-the-art) for 
monetary policy transparency and that only a few very experienced inflation targeters 
have been doing it succesfully. A well-functioning forecasting and policy analysis 
system, efficient monetary policy communication and an overall high level of central 
bank credibility are among the necessary preconditons that have to be met to start 
publishing an interest rate forecast.  
Third, we tend to believe that the CNB belongs to the group of central banks 
that have significantly contributed to developing an inflation targeting regime. As such, 
the CNB meets all those general requirements mentioned above, in our view. As for 
interest rate forecasts in particular, we do not find any evidence of significant dif-
ferences in forecasting performance between the CNB on one hand and financial 
analysts and market participants on the other hand.  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    575
Fourth, the current way of communicating the likely future development of in-
terest rates has proven to be efficient in influencing, to a certain extent, the market 
expectations of future monetary policy. As the empiric data shows, however, it is not 
clear whether the (asymmetric) risk assessment in combination with the verbal de-
scription of the interest rate forecast has always been a sufficiently precise guide for 
the market participants. 
Fifth, after the CNB starts publishing the numerical values of its interest rate 
forecasts in 2008, the alignment of market expectations with the view of the CNB will 
probably increase. In the case of a symmetric risk assessment, market expectations 
will likely move closer to the CNB forecast. In the case of an asymmetric risk as-
sessment, the market expectations will obviously still differ from the CNB forecast in 
a desirable  direction.  Overall,  publishing  the interest  rate  forecast  should  enhance 
the accountability and credibility of the CNB forecasts and improve the efficiency of 
its monetary policy execution. 
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